Abstract: Recent research has documented a positive relationship between real exchange rate (RER) levels and economic growth in developing countries. The literature has interpreted this correlation as causality running from RER levels to growth rates; i.e., more competitive RER levels tend to favor growth. Little effort has been made, however, on the analysis of the policy instruments required to implement a successful competitive RER strategy. An exchange rate policy targeting a permanent change in the RER may run into difficulties: it is well documented that nominal and real exchange rate movements are correlated almost one for one in the short run but such co-movement vanishes in the long run. Targeting instead a transitory RER undervaluation can have long-lasting effects on economic performance if RER competitiveness is stable and durable enough to provide incentives for modern tradable activities to expand. The ability to provide such an environment may be beyond the scope of exchange rate policy. This paper aims to shed light on the complementary policies that facilitate the success of an exchange rate policy that temporarily increases competitiveness. A formal model is developed to analyze these issues. The main conclusion is that a currency depreciation is more likely to accelerate growth if it is simultaneously implemented with domestic demand management policies that prevent non-tradable price inflation and wage management policies that coordinate wage increases with tradable productivity growth.
Introduction
Competitive real exchange rate (RER) levels are favorable for economic development. This appears to be the conclusion of a significant body of research that finds a robust positive association between RER levels and economic growth in developing countries.
2 Empirical evidence strongly suggests that while RER overvaluation hurts growth, undervaluation favors it.
3 It is unclear, however, what the exact mechanisms driving these results are. A possible channel is via the effect on the balance of payments. In developing countries with substantial open or hidden unemployment, policies that mobilize unemployed and underemployed resources can accelerate growth. This, however, has an impact on the balance of payments, especially if the dependence on imported capital goods is significant. In such conditions, a higher RER would help relax foreign exchange (FX) bottlenecks that otherwise could restrain the development process. This argument highlights the notion that developing countries are capital goods importers and that current account deficits tend to adjust via slower growth (i.e., quantities) than through an endogenous RER depreciation (i.e., prices). Porcile and Lima (2010) and Razmi et al. (2012) are recent examples of this kind of rationale. Another possible mechanism rests on the notion that the tradable sector is 'special' in developing countries because it is the locus where increasing returns to scale in the form of technological spillovers and learning by doing externalities are more prevalent. 4 A higher RER level elicits a reallocation of resources toward the production of tradables that accelerates economic growth. Rodrik (2008) and Korinek and Serven (2010) recent contributions emphasizing this channel.
The effect of RER competitiveness on economic growth is mediated in both channels by the expansion of the tradable sector. In the first one, it increases the production of exportables and import substitutes, thus augmenting the capacity to import capital goods and facilitating capital accumulation and growth. In the second, it induces the reallocation of resources in activities operating under increasing returns, which accelerates growth. Research has not yielded a clear answer regarding the relative importance of each channel, but both of them suggest that economic development and structural change are tradable-led.
Based on this evidence, some authors suggest that developing countries should attempt to keep their RERs competitive to stimulate dynamic tradable activities. A typical objection to this proposition is that managing the RER beyond the short run is out of governments' reach. 5 Argentina's experience during the 2000s may illustrate this point. After the 2002 devaluation, the authorities tried to stimulate non-traditional exports and import substitutes by keeping the value of the peso low. The economy reacted almost immediately to this incentive and started to grow at 8-9% per year. Initially, the expansion did not generate significant inflationary pressures due to the existence of high levels of unemployment and unutilized capacity. However, as the economy moved closer to full employment, inflation began to accelerate. Given that the central bank kept the nominal exchange rate relatively stable, the acceleration of domestic price and wage inflation generated a persistent appreciation of the RER, which hurt the profitability of the tradable activities that were the original target of the development policy. By late 2011 -after 9 years of rapid but decelerating growth -the Argentine economy entered an overvaluation-stagnation trap.
Argentina's recent experience may be interpreted as a confirmation that governments cannot manage the RER with long-term development objectives. The case of Chile between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, however, suggests otherwise. As in the case of Argentina, Chile suffered a severe financial and balance of payments crises in 1982 causing a large devaluation. Once the exchange rate was stabilized, the authorities decided to implement a crawling-bands system, in which the the exchange rate was adjusted according to past inflation. The goal was to keep the RER around the post-crisis competitive level. The competitiveness stimulus triggered a rapid and strong recovery starting in 1984. As in the case of Argentina, the initial expansion did not cause a significant acceleration of inflation due to the high unemployment. Unlike Argentina, the gradual reduction of unemployment did not cause a significant RER appreciation via higher inflation. On the contrary, Chile managed to simultaneously preserve the RER competitive, sustain high rates of growth and reduce inflation. During this period, Chile experienced the most rapid and sustained growth episode in its history, sometimes referred to as the Chilean "golden age". 6 The strategy was abandoned in the late 1990s, after the Asian crises, not because of signs of unsustainability, but because of the authorities' conviction that managing the exchange rate with a RER objective was incompatible with a full integration to (volatile) global financial markets.
The comparison between the experiences of Argentina and Chile is interesting because both countries began from very similar initial conditions (i.e., balance of payments and financial crises, very depreciated domestic currencies, relatively low inflation rates and high unemployment), pursue a similar policy objective (i.e., maintain a competitive RER), but obtained markedly different results. A closer look at these experiences suggests that a key factor explaining their different trajectories was the way macroeconomic policy was conducted in each country. While attempting to preserve the RER competitive, Argentina followed over-expansionary fiscal, monetary and wage policies that ended up appreciating the RER through the acceleration of price and wage inflation. Chile, on the contrary, used these policies coordinately to "lean against the wind" of RER appreciation that emerged as the economy was growing. As a result, Chile managed to moderate price and wage inflation, preserve the RER competitive for a much longer period and favor the expansion of dynamic tradable activities.
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The contrast between these experiences highlights the important role that macroeconomic policy can play in a development strategy when it attempts to preserve the RER competitive. It also suggests that the conduct of macroeconomic policy to successfully carry this strategy is complex. The aim of this paper is to explore formally how macroeconomic policy needs to be conducted in a tradable-led strategy for development, in which the authorities seek to maximize the time length during which the RER remains competitive. The main conclusion is that exchange rate management would more likely stimulate the expansion the tradable sector if it is simultaneously implemented with domestic demand management policies that prevent non-tradable price inflation and wage management policies that coordinate wage increases with tradable productivity growth.
The paper is organized in five sections. After this introduction, the next section discusses the difficulties that governments face at keeping the RER competitive long enough to stimulate the expansion of tradable activities. Section 3 presents a dual-economy model to analyze formally how macroeconomic policy should be conducted. Section 4 shows that exchange rate policy may be unable to manage the dynamic behavior of the RER to induce capital accumulation in the tradable sector, but it may have more chances if it is coordinated with domestic demand and wage management policies. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Motivation
The goal of a competitive RER strategy for development is to raise profitability in dynamic tradable activities to stimulate their expansion. The RER is the relative price between tradables and non-tradables, including labor. Thus, everything else constant, a higher RER level yields higher profit rates for tradables and consequently induces investment in these activities. 8 A key practical question regards the policies -if any -that can deliver such a favorable relative price configuration for a significant period. It is unlikely that it can be permanently achieved by just manipulating the nominal exchange rate. Empirical evidence convincingly shows that the correlation between nominal and real exchange rate movements is almost one for one in the short run, but it gradually vanishes over time (Taylor and Taylor 2004) .
Exchange rate policy does not need to affect the RER permanently to be useful in a development strategy. A temporary deviation of the RER from equilibrium may suffice to have long-lasting effects on the economy. This is widely accepted in the case of a transitory RER overvaluation. We have both a good deal of evidence and plausible explanations to believe that it can have deleterious effects on domestic tradable firms. For instance, Krugman (1987) developed a trade model showing how a transitory currency appreciation can lead to a permanent contraction of the tradable sector to illustrate the British experience of deindustrialization after Thatcher's tight monetary policy in the early 1980s. Similarly, Ros and Skott (1998) built a dual-economy model to characterize the deindustrialization process in Latin America after the implementation of trade liberalization and currency overvaluation policies during the 1990s. The existence of dynamic increasing returns in the tradable sector is a key element in both stories. Given this assumption, a transitory currency appreciation can erode tradable profitability permanently if during the transitory period domestic productivity deteriorates significantly. Once the RER reverts to its long-run equilibrium level, domestic firms will have suffered a substantial productivity loss turning them uncompetitive in the international markets. The result is a permanent contraction of the tradable sector. By symmetry, this mechanism also applies to the case of a transi-8 An increase in tradable profitability can be achieved or strengthened with sectoral policies such as subsidized credits, tax exceptions, direct subsidies, infrastructure building and other conventional industrial and trade policies. Most successful development experiences used these instruments extensively (Rodrik 1995) . Since the 1980s, however, they gradually lost mainstream appeal as the critics pointed to information problems, rent-seeking and government failures. Their use has also been threatened by WTO regulations. Without implying any judgment, in this paper I ignore the role of these policies and focus exclusively on the RER. tory real depreciation that induces a permanent expansion of the tradable sector. For this to happen, the relative price incentive -although not permanent -needs to be stable and durable enough to induce firms to invest. The ability to achieve it via a change in the nominal exchange rate depends on the degree of pass-through to domestic prices and wages, which would largely depend on the conditions in the labor market.
Consider possible stylized trajectories of a small open developing economy with non-trivial unemployment/underemployment. Imagine initially a one-time devaluation that positions the RER at a competitive level and then the nominal exchange rate remains fixed. In the short run, the devaluation raises the profitability in the tradable sector and switches demand from tradables to non-tradables. Profit-maximizing firms in the tradable sector would expand output and employment. Non-tradable output would also increase due to the rise of demand generated by the positive income and substitution effects. Thus, an exchange rate policy targeting a competitive RER is likely to have a positive impact on economic activity in the short run.
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The interesting developments occur beyond the short run. If investment is sensitive to profitability, capital accumulation in the tradable sector would respond to the incentive of a higher RER.
10 How strong and long would the accumulation process be? This depends on how the constellation of relative prices affecting tradable profitability evolves as the economy expands. Since the absolute price of tradables remains relatively stable after the devaluation, the evolution of relative prices would depend on the dynamic behavior of non-tradable prices and nominal wages.
Non-tradable prices are determined by domestic market conditions. Since the analysis focuses on a medium run process, it may be reasonable to think of a situation in which productivity growth in the non-tradable sector is negligible, making supply conditions depend exclusively on the availability of labor.
11 In a 9 A devaluation can certainly have contractionary effects in the short-run (Frankel 2005) . In the case they exist, once digested, the expansive effects described above are assumed to prevail. 10 Investment is mostly dominated by expected profitability (although actual profitability may also play a relevant role when firms face credit constraints). Consequently, expectations about the future are crucial for investment decisions. The view I adopt about the way agents form expectations is rather "behavioralist." Future is by its own nature unknown. Besides, agents face costs at gathering information and have limited cognitive abilities to process the information at their dispose. In such contexts, past and present conditions could be reasonable guides to form expectations about the future. Thus, if the RER competitiveness incentive has been stable and lasted long enough, it would likely induce tradable firms to invest. 11 Although a key input, labor is not the only one influencing supply conditions of non-tradables. Infrastructure, energy and land may be other relevant factors. For simplicity, I will ignore the possibility that these factors may constrain the supply of non-tradables.
developing economy, it seems reasonable to assume that the supply of non-tradable goods is quite elastic at the beginning of the development process due to the existence of unemployment and underemployment. The degree of elasticity would depend critically on the scarcity of labor. The supply is likely to be substantially more elastic in a low-income country (e.g., China) than in a middleincome country (e.g., Argentina or Chile). This difference plays an important role in the argument. Demand for non-tradables, on the other hand, depends on income and the relative price between tradables and non-tradables. If a competitive RER accelerates economic growth, the demand for non-tradables would also grow fast. In addition to this income effect, it would also be stimulated by the substitution effect caused by the change in relative prices. The pace of demand growth is also influenced by the government, both because it spends directly on non-tradables and because it can affect private demand via different policies.
Given these expected behaviors of demand and supply, as the economy grows there would be a tendency towards non-tradable price increases; i.e., towards RER appreciation. 12 The precise pace that this tendency takes would depend on the elasticity of supply and the way the government influences the evolution of the demand for non-tradables. In middle-income countries, where surplus labor is less abundant and price adjustments are more prevalent, macroeconomic policy may be crucial. If the government further stimulates the demand for non-tradable goods, prices would tend to rise faster and the competitiveness incentive would tend to evaporate rapidly (e.g., Argentina). On the contrary, if it tries to decelerate the demand for non-tradables, it may soften the appreciation trend (e.g., Chile). Domestic demand management policies -which include monetary, fiscal and incomes policies -can be used to manage the pace of the demand for non-tradables. Given that under a competitive RER strategy exchange rate policy is actively used to target the price of tradables, a question arises regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy. The well-known open economy trilemma posits that in conditions of capital mobility, monetary and exchange rate policies cannot be used simultaneously. Real world experience shows, however, that because financial assets are not perfect substitutes across countries -contrary to the assumption of perfect substitution that leads to the prediction of the trilemma -sterilized FX market interventions provide some leeway for a simultaneous use of these policies, especially when a country runs current account surpluses. Capital account management techniques can also be useful to gain some control over both. 13 In any case, even when these instruments are used, it seems clear that in a competitive RER regime since monetary policy is subordinated to exchange rate policy, the ability to simultaneously use it with domestic demand goals is reduced. Thus, fiscal policy has an important responsibility in managing the pace of domestic demand.
The evolution of wages is affected by the conditions in the labor market. It seems natural to think that in low-income countries, where the elasticity of labor supply tends to be high, employment expands without much upward pressures on wages; the extreme case being one with constant real wages in an economy with unlimited supply of labor as in Lewis (1954) . By contrast, more pronounced wage increases occur in middle-income countries where surplus labor is less abundant. Besides labor market conditions, wage determination is also affected by institutional, political, cultural/moral factors. These factors are in their very nature context-dependent, thus leaving wages -as Rees (1993) argues -within "a zone of indeterminacy" (p. 244). Importantly, these factors can be influenced by public intervention. Governments have direct influence over labor market regulations and therefore over wages. They can also affect wages indirectly by influencing wage-norms or establishing the rules for wage bargaining between workers and firms. They also set public wages which are in many cases a point of reference for the determination of private sector wages. Thus, the level and evolution of wages are to some extent affected by governments through these direct and indirect instruments, which can be labeled as wage management policies. Figure 1 helps illustrate the argument developed so far. It portraits three stylized dynamics of the RER competitiveness incentive in a developing economy. This is captured as the distance between labor productivity (Y/L) and the product wage (W/P T ), both of which are key determinants of the profit rate in the tradable sector.
14 As discussed above, tradable production may operate with increasing returns to scale. Before the nominal devaluation at time t, tradable productivity and the product wage are stagnant. The devaluation reduces the product wage due to the increase in the tradable price. A critical issue is whether the resulting increase in profitability is stable and durable enough to trigger a sustained expan-13 For an analysis of the conditions under which sterilized FX interventions are sustainable see Frenkel (2007) . See Ocampo (2003) on the effectiveness of capital controls in developing countries. 14 For simplicity I use the product wage as a proxy of unit costs, which would also include nontradable goods. Since the determination of nominal wages are arguably influenced by the evolution of non-tradable prices, as modeled in the next section, the product wage captures the set of relative prices that are relevant to determine tradable sector's profitability. sion in the tradable sector. This would depend, on the one hand, on whether it is a low-income or middle-income economy and, on the other hand, on the way macroeconomic policy is conducted.
In low-income countries with high elasticity of labor supply, the increased profitability would tend to persist: output and employment growth in this sector would not generate major upward pressures on wages. An extreme case is represented by the red line which remains flat during the transition period. The profitability incentive -i.e., the distance between the red line W/P T and the thick solid black line Y/L -increases in time due to the productivity gains arising from the increasing returns. Eventually, wages would tend to rise as the supply of labor gradually becomes more "limited," but this would happen beyond the mediumrun frame of this analysis (thus not shown in the figure). This stylized case could be associated with China's experience since the early 1980s until the recent arrival at the Lewis turning point (Zhang et al. 2011 ). This logic also applies to other Asian economies facing similar Lewisian transitions.
Such a scenario is less likely in middle-income countries -like in the cases of Argentina and Chile discussed above -in which labor supply is not that elastic. The initial expansion of tradable sector would gradually generate upward pressures on non-tradable prices and wages, eroding the relative price incentive. However, different outcomes can arise depending on how gradual this process is; or put it differently, depending on the "race" between the product wage and tradable productivity growth. If the competitiveness incentive erodes relatively fast, investment in the tradable sector would not prosper and the virtuous effect of accumulation in the tradable sector would not operate. This case is represented by the gray solid lines in Figure 1 and resembles the Argentina's experience during the 2000s. The contraction of the product wage after the devaluation is rapidly reversed. The incentives to invest do not last long enough and both the size of the tradable sector and its productivity remain unchanged.
A different result may arise if, together with the devaluation, the government implements domestic demand management policies to counter the tendency towards non-tradable price increases and wage management policies to coordinate wages increases with productivity growth in the tradable sector. This case is illustrated by the solid black lines and resembles the case of Chile between the mid 1980s and the late 1990s. After the devaluation, the rise in the product wage is steady but moderate. This evolution maintains the profitability incentives during the initial period and thus induces investment in tradable activities. As capital accumulates, this sector becomes gradually more productive and therefore increases in the product wage do not undermine tradable profitability. As a result, the expansion of the tradable sector not only comes jointly with higher economic growth but also with increasing product wages. Figure 2 depicts the actual behavior of the product wage and labor productivity in the experiences of Argentina and Chile.
15 Both variables for each country are shown as indexes that take the value one in the base year (i.e., 2001 = 1 for Argentina and 1981 = 1 for Chile). The base year is the last complete year in which the exchange rate was fixed in each experience. In year 2 the devaluations occurred. The horizontal axis indicates numbers of years. The Argentine experience goes from 2001 to 2012 and the Chilean from 1981 to 1997. The actual behaviors are qualitatively very similar to those of Figure 1 . In Argentina, the competitiveness incentive disappears rapidly without generating sustained labor productivity growth. It is evident that productivity growth decelerated markedly after 2007. In Chile, on the contrary, the reversion of the product wage was substantially slower, maintaining the competitiveness incentive and thus allowing rapid and sustained labor productivity growth. Interestingly, in 1997 the product wage was about 40% higher than before the devaluation and labor productivity more than 80% higher. Consequently, 17 years later, tradable profitability still maintained a significant part of the competitiveness incentive generated after the initial devaluation.
The Model
In this section, I develop a dual open economy model to formally address the stylized behaviors described in the previous section. The model extends the analytical framework presented in Ros and Skott (1998) in a number of ways: it provides a more general treatment of the labor market and unemployment, it examines the effects on the real wage and the RER of fiscal and wage management policies and it extends the analysis of the effects on the dynamics of capital accumulation, productivity and real wages of different speeds of adjustment of the capital stock and wages. These extensions allow to analyze the policy problems that macroeconomic management faces in a competitive RER strategy for development. The model shares with Ros and Skott (1998) the view that the tradable (T) sector is the locus of modern technology and assumes that it operates with increasing returns to scale due to learning by doing. The tradable sector is the only one that utilizes capital, K, whose stock is given in the short run. The tradable good can be used for consumption or investment. The non-tradable (N) sector uses labor and a fixed factor. The economy is characterized as developing not only because of its duality but also because of the existence of substantial open unemployment (U). There is a single labor market with a homogeneous nominal wage rate, W, which is also given in the short run due to nominal stickiness.
Basic Relationships and the Behavior in the Short Run
The economy is small and open to trade and finance. Since the exchange rate, E, is credibly fixed, the interest parity condition imposes that
where i is the domestic cost of finance and i* the international interest rate. Given this simplification, monetary policy is passive as posited by the trilemma when (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) .
the exchange rate is fixed and capital perfectly mobile. The assumption also implies that the capital account of the balance of payments adjusts to compensate the result of the current account. The price of tradables, P T , is determined by the law of one price:
where * T P is the international price of the tradable good. Thus, through exchange rate policy the government controls the absolute price of tradables.
The tradable sector operates with a Cobb-Douglas production function with sectoral increasing returns to scale due to learning by doing externalities. For the representative firm this is
where Y T and L T represent output and employment in the tradable sector and K γ the external effect. The average sectoral capital stock K is exogenous to the individual firm and in equilibrium is equal to the capital stock of the representative firm, i.e., = .
K K The learning by doing externality is assumed to be adequately small so that α+γ < 1. This is a plausible assumption, which will be important in the dynamic analysis of Subsection 3.2.
Given the capital stock and the wage rate, firms in the tradable sector demand labor at any point in time so to maximize profits in a perfect competition environment. Hence
where T T W P ω ≡ is the product wage.
Profits in the tradable sector, Π T , are:
The non-tradable sector produces using labor and a fixed factor. The production function for the representative firm in this sector is
where D is a constant, Y N and L N represent non-tradable output and employment and with 0 < β < 1. The demand for labor in this sector also arises from profit maximization by the owners of the fixed factor in an atomistic and price-taking context. Thus,
where P N is the price of the non-tradable good and X expresses this price relative to the nominal wage rate; i.e., .
From equations (6) and (7) it is clear that the higher the value of β the more elastic non-tradable supply is.
Given that monetary policy is passive, domestic demand management policies are conducted through fiscal policy. Since in practice governments mostly spend on non-tradables, I assume that public consumption is only on non-tradable goods and the amount is θ times its tax collection. Tax revenues, in turn, come from an ad-valorem tax on non-tradable private consumption,t N . Hence,
with θ > 0, 0 < t N < 1 and G N representing public spending. Public sector primary surplus is thus defined as
where s g = t N (1−θ) is the primary surplus rate. It is immediate that s g defines the situation of government sector primary balance. When s g = 0, primary fiscal accounts are balanced, when s g > 0 the government faces a primary surplus and when s g < 0 a primary deficit. 16 For simplicity, I focus on the primary surplus and do not explore the intertemporal behavior of public debt. This omission is unlikely to hide an unsustainable behavior in the management of macroeconomic policy: the recommended fiscal policy will be contractionary in order to moderate RER appreciation forces coming from non-tradable price inflation. Thus, macroeconomic policy coordination will go in the direction of reducing public debt. In any case, to minimize the concerns about the evolution of public debt, I will assume initially that s g = 0. In Section 4, it will be shown that policy coordination requires a transitory increase in fiscal surplus; i.e., s g > 0. Thus, during most of the analysis, fiscal policy will have a neutral effect on public sector net asset position. Only when macroeconomic policy coordination is required to maintain the competitive RER incentive, it will transitorily increase public sector net asset position.
Private consumption derives from consumers' utility maximization of a CobbDouglas function. Hence,
where μ and 1−μ are the shares of consumers income spent on tradables and nontradables, respectively. I follow a standard practice and assume that workers do not save, while capitalists in the tradable sector and owners of the fixed factor in the non-tradable sector save a fraction s of their profits and rents. Evidence systematically shows that the saving rate out of wages is substantially smaller than that resulting from corporate profits. If workers were allowed to save in the model, they would be owners of part of the capital stock in the tradable sector -probably indirectly through financial claims -making them receivers of part of tradable profits. Even under the simplest assumption that all classes have the same propensity to save, allowing workers to save would complicate the algebra. Since the incidence of income distribution on consumption is not at the center of the argument addressed in this paper, I opt for the simplified specification. 17 Hence,
Since non-tradables are used only for domestic consumption, the market equilibrium condition requires that output equals expenditure
Finally, there is a fixed labor force L, which is either unemployed or employed in one of the two sectors. Thus
Equations (1)- (13) define the short-run behavior of the economy; i.e., for given values of K and W. The subsystem defined by equations (6)-(12) determines the short-run equilibrium conditions for the non-tradable goods markets. Solving 17 The domestic interest rate, i, could influence the behavior of private savings. However, since it is given by the international interest rate, s appears in the model as a parameter. As discussed in Section 2, the government could use sterilized interventions and capital management techniques to regain some control over monetary policy. In that case, it could manage i within a certain range and thus influence the evolution of the price of non-tradables through s. In other words, demand management policies would also include monetary policy. Although governments targeting competitive RER levels actually use a combination of policies to have some autonomy in conducting monetary policy, I will ignore this possibility to keep the algebra simple. However, s could be thought as a variable potentially influenced by monetary policy and other saving incentives offered by the government.
for the equilibrium value of the non-tradable price relative to the nominal wage rate, , X < Since W is given in the short run, movements in X are equivalent to movements in P N . A rise in K increases the demand for non-tradable goods, raising employment, output and prices in the non-tradable sector (i.e., ↑ X). An increase in ω T reduces profitability in this sector contracting tradable output and thus reducing private consumption. The result is a reduction in the demand for non-tradables and in its price (i.e., ↓ X). Domestic demand management policies through s g also affect the behavior of the price of non-tradables. A rise of s g reduces the aggregate expenditure on non-tradables and thus lowers the price of non-tradable goods (i.e., ↓ X). This is easy to see: the government spends less in non-tradables than the amount of resources absorbed in the form of taxes, which otherwise would go to private consumption of non-tradables. 18 Finally, an increase in E is equivalent to a reduction in ω T . Thus, by lowering the product wage as characterized in the stylized behaviors of Figure 1 , an exchange rate policy targeting a more competitive RER leads in the short run to an increase in employment and output in both sectors and a rise in the price of non-tradable goods (i.e., ↑ X). To assess whether it also triggers a sustained expansion of the tradable sector and whether other policies are needed to complement it, we have to characterize the dynamic behavior of the system.
Dynamic Behavior
By assumption, the system has K and W predetermined at any given point in time. The rate of capital accumulation K is assumed to be a positive function of the rate of profit in the tradable sector r relative to the cost of finance, i. Hence
with the derivative fʹ > 0 and f(0) = 0.
From equations (2)-(5), the rate of profit in the tradable sector is
It rises with K and contracts with ω T . K has a positive feedback effect on ˆ: K when it increases, it raises tradable productivity and thus profitability, which generates further incentives to invest. But, capital accumulation also raises employment in the tradable sector, which induces upward pressures on the product wage. Consequently, the sustainability of capital accumulation would depend on the dynamic evolution of these two opposing forces affecting the profit rate: labor productivity and the product wage. Because P T is fixed, the evolution of ω T depends on the dynamic behavior of W.
Variations in W are assumed to be determined in the bargaining process between workers and firms. On the one hand, wages adjust according to the gap between the actual real consumption wage rate, , W P and the real consumption wage rate that workers demand given their bargaining power. I call the latter the "bargained" real wage rate, ω. On the other hand, nominal wages are influenced by expected price inflation ˆ. E P Hence
Workers bargaining power is captured in equation (17) through the employment rate, l ≡ L T +L N , where the labor force has been normalized to unity (i.e., L = 1). It seems reasonable to think that as the economy grows and the employment rate increases, workers gain bargaining power and demand -and firms are more willing to give -nominal wages that imply higher real wages; i.e., a partial derivative ω ι > 0. On the theoretical side, this assumption is in line with efficiency wage models and the literature of wage bargaining. The assumption is also supported by empirical evidence. In their influential work on the "wage curve," Blanchflower and Oswald (1994 and 2005) have established the existence of a negative relationship between wage levels and regional/sectoral unemployment. They interpret this stylized fact as indicating that workers in labor markets with lower unemployment rates have greater bargaining power and consequently obtain higher real wages. Based on these theoretical and empirical grounds, it seems safe to posit that in a development process in which the employment rate is increasing real wages also increase.
As discussed in Section 2, wage determination is also influenced by institutional, political, cultural/moral elements, which are context-dependent and can be influenced by government intervention. z is the variable condensing these factors, which is subject to government influence via wage management policies. A rise in z represents the government promoting a rise in the real wage. This could be, for instance, the decision to raise the real value of the minimum wage rate or a generous public sector wage settlement. Wage management policies conducted through z can affect not only the steady state value of the real wage, but also the speed at which wages change over time. Governments, for instance, can regulate the duration of labor contracts between unions and firms or implement temporary incomes policies (e.g., wage freezes) and thus influence the lifetime of wage rigidity. This effect is captured by the the speed of wage adjustment λ(z). Thus, the government can use the policy instrument z to increase or decrease the length of the period during which a wage contract lasts, according to the partial derivative λ z > 0.
To facilitate the mathematical exposition, I give the "bargained" real wage rate a specific and plausible form
where ( ) z ω represents a real wage rate that prevails in conditions of very low employment levels (or a minimum real wage rate), with a partial derivative 0.
z ω > Labor market conditions, in turn, affect the determination of the bargained real wage via the employment rate l and the parameter τ > 0. One important characteristic of this specific form is that the elasticity of the bargained real wage with respect to the employment rate is variable. The impact of changes in the employment rate on the real wage is lower (higher) for lower (higher) levels of employment. This seems a plausible description of the influence of labor market conditions on the determination of wages.
Expectation formation can be critical for macroeconomic adjustment in the short run, but given our focus on medium-run behavior, it is reasonable to assume that workers manage to adjust nominal wages to the actual evolution of the consumption price level, P. They may not anticipate price variations precisely in the short run but it is unlikely that they fail systematically to do so in longer spans of time. Therefore, I assume that workers have perfect foresight. Hence
where μ and 1−μ are the weights of tradable and non-tradable prices in the private consumption basket. Since P T is fixed by exchange rate policy at any point in time, expected inflation is equivalent to non-tradable price inflation
By definition P N ≡ XW. Thus, using equation (14) we get:
Since P T is given at any point in time ˆ= .
T W ω Thus, using equations (17)- (21), we get an expression for the dynamic behavior of ω T
Expressions 15 and 16 describe the evolution of the capital stock over time: K increases with K and shrinks with ω T . The dynamic behavior of the product wage is more involved to derive. Appendix A gives a formal derivation, but intuitively it can be seen that ˆT ω increases with K and declines with ω T . When K increases, the employment rate expands and the price of non-tradables goes up. The higher employment rate raises workers bargaining power and the higher price of nontradables reduces the actual real wage rate. Both effects generate upward pressure on ω T . Conversely, increases in ω T -by reducing tradable profitability -lead to a contraction in the employment rate and in the price of non-tradables. Thus, the effects go in the opposite direction, generating downward pressure on ω T .
Formally, we get a dynamic system for K and ω T defined by the following reduced-form equations:
with partial derivatives (23) and (24) are positively sloped. The ˆ0 K= locus is defined by the combinations of K and ω T for which the capital stock is stationary. Given the increasing returns in the tradable sector, a rise in K augments tradable profitability inducing more investment. Only a higher ω T restores the profit rate to a level that keeps K constant. The ˆ0 T ω = locus describes the "equilibrium" in the labor market in the sense that the resulting value of ω T is stationary. An increase in K raises the employment rate and the price of non-tradables. The first effect enhances workers bargaining power and the second reduces actual real wages. Both lead to demands for higher wages. A rise in the nominal wage rate consistent with the stationary product wage rate ω T restrains workers from demanding further increases. The required reaction of wages to keep the labor market in "equilibrium," however, is not uniform along the ˆ0 T ω = locus, but becomes more pronounced with higher levels of K. This feature is because the bargained real wage is more sensitive to changes in the employment rate as the latter increases [see equation (18)]. A given variation in the employment rate would derive in higher changes in wages the higher the employment rate is. This particular aspect of the ˆ0 T ω = locus -i.e., a variable elasticity of ω T with respect to K along the locus -is key for the possibility of multiple equilibria in the model. Appendix B shows the conditions under which multiple equilibria arise. A critical condition for its existence is that the learning-by-doing externality in the production of tradables, γ, be moderate; more precisely, that γ+α < 1. If this condition is not fulfilled, the productivity gains arising from learning by doing would be so large that the profitability incentives for capital accumulation would be unbounded. Assuming that the not very restrictive conditions specified in Appendix B are met, the only interesting case involves two intersections between the ˆ0 T ω = and ˆ0 K= loci; one at low levels of K and another at high levels of K. 19 The low-K intersection would be a saddle point and the high-K intersection a spiral or a node. Depending on the speeds of adjustment of K and ω T , the system would show different dynamic behaviors. A key aspect dominating the dynamic behavior of the system is that the effect of K on K is positive (i.e., F K > 0) and the effect of ω T on ˆT ω is negative (i.e., 0 ).
for details). The nullclines of equations

T G ω <
This implies that capital accumulation is a destabilizing force, while the product wage represents a stabilizing one. Because of this, the speeds of adjustment of K and ω T would play a critical role defining the stability or lack of it at the high-K equilibrium. The higher the speed of adjustment of K (ω T ), the more likely that the high-K equilibrium becomes unstable (stable). Since I am interested in the case in which the high-K equilibrium is locally stable, I will assume that the speed of adjustment of K is low enough and the speed of adjustment of ω T high enough to guarantee such an outcome. Figure 3 describes the benchmark phase diagram. Point C represents the high-K locally stable equilibrium (i.e., the "development" equilibrium) and B the low-K saddle point. A is another locally stable equilibrium that represents the extreme case of complete underdevelopment. The saddle path divides the phase diagrams in two regions. The region on the left is the basin of attraction of A, whereas that on the right is the basin of attraction of C. Thus, if the economy is initially located to the left of the saddle path, the dynamic behavior would gradu-ally take it towards the complete underdevelopment equilibrium A. If it begins to the right of the saddle path, the dynamic behavior would take it to the development equilibrium C. Only in the case that the economy is initially situated on the saddle path, it would end up at the saddle point B. Importantly, the location of the saddle path would depend on the speeds of adjustment. This issue is further discussed in Section 4.
Macroeconomic Policy
A higher RER would stimulate investment in tradables. This, however, does not guarantee the case of a virtuous dynamics of economic development and structural change. Its chances would depend on the "race" between productivity gains in the tradable sector associated with capital accumulation and the resulting rise in the product wage. Figure 4 illustrates the case in which exchange rate management targeting a more competitive RER kicks-off such a virtuous dynamics. A nominal devaluation moves the economy trapped in underdevelopment region represented by point A to B 1 , which is to the right of the saddle path. At this point the positive feedback effects of K on K more than compensate the increases in ω T associated with higher employment rate and non-tradable prices. The economy would gradually move towards the equilibrium point C, where it would eventually reach higher capital per capita and product wage levels.
At B 1 , given that both K and tradable productivity are low, the profit rate is high enough to induce investment because of the low value of ω T achieved by
the devaluation. Exchange rate policy might not always be able to deliver this result. The real effect of a devaluation may be rapidly reversed due to a high pass-through on non-tradable prices or to real wage resistance by workers. Such outcomes are actually in line with the evidence from time series econometrics, which has documented that the responses of the RER to changes in the nominal exchange rate are not linear: the speed of reversion is higher for larger depreciations (Taylor et al. 2001) . A quick erosion of tradable profitability would undermine the incentives to investment and capital accumulation in the tradable sector would not prosper. The likelihood of an outcome like this one increases with the size of the required nominal depreciation to move the economy from one state to another. In terms of the model, the larger the distance between A and B 1 , the less likely that a devaluation can trigger a virtuous dynamics. The government could attempt to offset the erosion of tradable profitability with further devaluations. This strategy, however, is likely to fail. A policy of continuous nominal devaluations would likely accelerate the rate of non-tradable prices and wage inflation, moving the economy into a devaluation-inflation spiral. In an inflationary environment with higher uncertainty and relative price volatility, investment in the tradable sector would become less likely. Exchange rate policy may thus face a limit in its ability to deliver a RER level that is both competitive and stable to induce investment in the tradable sector, while preserving macroeconomic stability at the same time. In terms of the model, it implies that reaching a situation like B 1 may not be feasible. Figure 5 shows the case of a devaluation in which the maximum "feasible" RER (i.e., the lowest "feasible" ω T ) is located on the left of the saddle path. The economy moves from A to B 2 , the latter representing a point with the same K but a higher ω T than point B 1 in Figure 4 . After the devaluation, the economy is still trapped in the underdevelopment zone. The RER competitiveness incentive would initially induce tradable firms to invest. The resulting rise in the employment rate and the price of non-tradables, however, elicits demands for higher wages, which reduces tradable profitability. Since the product wage rises faster than productivity, incentives to invest erode rapidly. The economy would end up crossing the ˆ0 K= locus and the incentives to invest would disappear. This dynamic behavior corresponds to the stylized behavior illustrated with gray lines in Figure 1 , which represents the experience of Argentina in the 2000s.
The government has instruments to moderate the upward pressures on ω T that erode tradable profitability. To restrain inflationary pressures in non-tradables prices and thus moderate the demands for wage increases, the government may decelerate the pace of the demand for non-tradables. An increase in the fiscal surplus (i.e., ↑ s g ) would accomplish that goal. The government may also want to coordinate the demand for wage increases with the rate of productivity growth in the tradable sector. Wage management policies -captured in the policy variable z -may be used for such a purpose.
The values of s g and z determine the location of the ˆ0 T ω = locus. An increase in s g reduces the equilibrium value of the price of non-tradables and raises the actual real wage rate,W/P. At any level of K, this implies that actual real wages are higher than the bargained real wage. Equilibrium in the labor market requires a contraction of W, which lowers ω T down to a new stationary level. This is represented with a downward shift of the ˆ0 T ω = locus. Similarly, a contraction of z
reduces the bargained real wage at any level of K. Equilibrium in the labor market requires a reduction of W, which shifts the ˆ0 T ω = locus down. Figure 6 illustrates the case when exchange rate policy is coordinated with domestic demand and wage management policies. The figure zooms in the low-K intersection leaving the high-K equilibrium out of sight. The thin ˆ0 T ω = locus and saddle path correspond to the case of no policy coordination. As in the case of Figure 5 , an exchange rate depreciation would move the economy from A to the same point B 2 in the underdevelopment zone. The dynamic behavior would be the same as in Figure 5 . However, if the same depreciation is coordinated with complementary policies that aim to preserve the competitiveness incentive longer (i.e., a rise in s g , a reduction in z or a combination of both), B 2 would be on the right of the saddle path. The use of complementary policies is represented by the thick ˆ0 T ω = locus and saddle path. In this new environment, the economy would experience a sustained process of capital accumulation that would eventually take it to the development equilibrium represented by C, which is not shown in the figure. This dynamic behavior corresponds to the stylized behavior illustrated with solid black lines in Figure 1 ; the "Chilean case."
The use of the complementary policies need not be permanent. Their implementation is critical at the beginning of the accumulation process, but they could be softened gradually. As the tradable sector becomes more mature (i.e., with higher capital-labor ratios and higher productivity), it can pay higher product wages. Thus, if the government decides to gradually increase their spending (↓ s g ) or implement measures to induce higher wages (↑ z), the accumulated gains in tradable productivity would tolerate the higher labor costs without compromis-
Figure 6 Macroeconomic policy coordination I.
ing profitability severely. In terms of Figure 6 , the government can reverse the policies and return the ˆ0 T ω = locus and saddle path to their original location provided the economy remains to the right of the saddle path. Thus, as mentioned in Section 3, during the period of policy coordination, the government would experience a transitory primary surplus and then return to a permanent situation of balanced primary budget.
The critical role of policy coordination can be illustrated in another way. Wage management policies not only affect the equilibrium level of wages, but also the speed at which the actual wage rate converges to its stationary value. This was incorporated in the model by making z affect the speed of wage adjustment λ. Figure 7 illustrates the effect of a reduction on the speed of wage adjustment by lowering z. For expositive purposes, the graph assumes that movements in z have no effect on the ˆ0 T ω = locus (i.e., z is not an argument of the bargained real wage function, ω), but they shift the position of the saddle path. In particular, a lower speed of wage adjustment shifts the saddle path closer to the ˆ0 K= locus, which is represented in Figure 7 as a move from the thin to the thick saddle path. The intuition is straightforward: a lower speed of wage adjustment makes the horizontal movements (i.e., K adjustments) relatively stronger, thus making the stability regions more fragile (i.e., the saddle path is easier to cross).
In terms of policy, this means that the government could, for instance, pass legislation extending the duration of the labor contracts. A longer period under which wages are given reduces uncertainty and makes investment stronger because the competitiveness incentive is perceived to last longer. The government could also promote firms-unions agreements in which wage adjustments during the initial period of the development strategy only occur provided that certain rate of tradable productivity growth is achieved. In terms of the model this policy implies a reduction of the speed of wage adjustment relatively to that of the capital stock (i.e., tradable productivity growth). The introduction of this kind of policies is captured in Figure 7 as a shift in the position of the saddle path. After their implementation, B 2 is located on the right of the thick saddle path, implying that the incentives to invest in tradables would sustain in time and that the economy would expand successfully towards C.
Conclusion
Recent research has found that competitive RER levels tend to accelerate economic growth in developing countries. The positive effects on growth appears to be mediated by the expansion of tradable production. Maintaining the RER competitive over an extended period is thus favorable for economic development. This, however, is not an easy task.
Non-tradable prices and wages tend to increase relative to the price of tradables along the development process. Macroeconomic policy coordination may help retard these tendencies and preserve tradable profitability, thus giving this sector time to enhance its productivity. In particular, it seems appropriate to conduct exchange rate policy simultaneously with domestic demand management policies that contain non-tradable price inflation and wage management policies that coordinate the pace of wage increases with tradable productivity growth. The Chilean experience with a stable and competitive RER between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s is an example of this kind of policy framework.
Such a strategy represents an alternative to the in-vogue floating cum inflation targeting (FIT) policy framework. Under this framework, central banks follow a mandate that focuses exclusively on inflation and neglect other policy objectives like the level and stability of the RER. To fulfill the inflation mandate, domestic demand management is carried through monetary policy using a reference interest rate as the main instrument. The suitability of this strategy for developing countries has recently been an object of controversy. Since credit markets in developing countries are shallow and therefore the sensitivity of aggregate demand to interest movements low, central banks may need to raise interest rates excessively to achieve the inflation target. Inflation is usually kept under control but mostly as a result of the appreciation of the exchange rate generated by capital inflows attracted by high interest rates. For this reason, many have argued that the FIT policy framework has a RER appreciation-bias and, because of it, it is not development-friendly. 20 The conduct of macroeconomic policy under a competitive RER strategy is more complex precisely because it requires the coordination of several policies. As discussed above, having some room for monetary policy may require the implementation of sterilized foreign interventions and capital account management techniques. Although there are examples of successful implementations -including that of Chile during the 1990s -these policies may face difficulties. Sterilization may generate significant quasi-fiscal costs, and capital inflows may find ways to circumvent regulations. In any case, financial integration implies that monetary policy is not completely autonomous when exchange rate policy is actively used to target the RER. For this reason, the role of fiscal policy in managing aggregate demand is substantially more important than in a FIT framework. Under a competitive RER strategy, fiscal policy has a contractionary-bias because it has to moderate real appreciation pressures resulting from non-tradable price inflation. This aspect has already been highlighted by other authors like Eichengreen (2007) and Frenkel (2008) .
The role of wage management policies in a competitive RER strategy is more controversial. The policy prescription that derives from the model in this paper is probably unappealing to policymakers. It suggests that they should attempt to persuade workers and their leaders that it is in their own benefit to accept wage increases that do not hurt tradable profitability severely. However, if economic development depends on the expansion of dynamic tradable activities as recent research suggests, and if tradable expansion depends on its profitability, it seems hard not to conclude that the rate of growth of the product wage cannot substantially outpace the rate of tradable productivity growth, especially during the early stages of development. The conclusion might have a sour taste. However, as the model in this paper illustrates, moderation in wage demands during the transition period has a reward. In the development equilibrium the capital stock, the product wage, the employment rate and tradable productivity are higher. This outcome is welfare-enhancing. It should not be surprising. In a developed economy, tradable activities can afford substantially higher wages because they are substantially more productive. Social pacts between governments, firms and workers linking wage increases to the productivity growth of key tradable activities may thus be an important element in a successful competitive RER strategy for development. 
Therefore, the ˆ0 T ω = locus is also positively sloped in the ω T -K space. In the important case of multiple equilibria -whose conditions are derived in appendix B -it is straightforward to see that the ˆ0 T ω = locus lies in between of the W P ω= and ˆ0
K= loci as described in Figure 8 .
B Existence of Multiple Equilibria
The existence of multiple equilibria occurs when the W P ω= and ˆ0
K= loci intersect more than once. The ˆ0 K= locus is obtained by setting r defined by equation (16) 
Equation (29) indicates that the ˆ0 K= locus is a positively sloped straight line in the lnω T -ln K space.
A necessary condition for the multiple intersections of the two loci is that the W P ω= locus in the ln ω T -ln K space has a lower slope than the ˆ0 K= locus for some values of K and a higher one for some other set of values of K.
To obtain the slope of the W P ω= locus in the ln ω T -ln K space, we need to substitute equations (14) and (18) into expression (26), take natural log to the resulting expression and differentiate it totally. With a little of algebra manipulation this yields As with expression (28), the one above is also positive. Its value, however, is not constant but critically depends on the evolution of l/(1−l) as K varies. Using equations (4), (7) and (14), it is clear that l/(1−l)→∞ as K→∞ and l/(1−l)→0 as K→0.
When K→∞,
The slope of the W P ω= locus is greater than that of the ˆ0 K= locus if only if
When K→0 | = ln (1 )(1 ) ( ) ln
(1 )(1 )
Given condition (32), the slope of the W P ω= locus is lower than that of the ˆ0 K= locus if
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
The existence of multiple equilibria requires condition (32) to hold. This implies that the positive external effects in the production of tradables need to be moderate, otherwise the productivity gains arising from learning by doing would be so large that the resulting profitability incentives for capital accumulation would be unbounded. The left-hand side of condition (34) is the slope of the ˆ0 K= locus [i.e., equation (29)]. This condition thus implies that for the two loci to intersect at low levels of K, the required reaction of ω T to changes in K to reach a stationary level of K has to be higher than the rises of ω T associated to the increases in the price of non-tradables when K expands. Condition (34) is more likely to hold the higher the values of α, β and μ; i.e., the more capital intensive the tradable production, the more elastic the supply of non-tradables and the higher the share of tradables in private consumption. Conditions (32) and (34) are empirically plausible and can both hold simultaneously. Assuming such a case implies that, similarly to Ros and Skott (1998) , the two loci intersect twice, once when they are tangent one to another or do not intersect.
